EXPOSITION OF A NEW THEORY ON THE MEASUREMENT
OF RISK' $1. EVERSINCE mathematicians first began to study the measurement of risk there has been general agreement on the following proposition: Expected values are computed by multiplying each possible gain by the number of ways in which it can occur, and then dividing the sum of these products by the total number of possible cases where, in this theory, the consideration of cases which are all of the same probability is insisted upon. If this rule be accepted, what remains to be done within the framework of this theory amounts to the enumeration of all alternatives, their breakdown into equi-probable cases and, finally, their insertion into corresponding classifications. $2. Proper examination of the numerous demonstrations of this proposition that have come forth indicates that they all rest upon one hypothesis: since there is no reason to assume that of two persons encountering identical risksj2 either guished mathematicians, was born in Groningen, January 29,1700 and died in Basle, March 17, 1782. He studied mathematics and medical sciences a t the University of Basle. In 1725 he accepted an invitation to the newly established academy in Petersburg, but returned to Basle in 1733 where he was appointed professor of physics and philosophy. Bernoulli was a member of the academies of Paris, Berlin, and Petersburg and the Royal Academy in London. He was the first to apply mathematical analysis to the problem of the movement of liquid bodies.
(On Bernoulli see: Handworterbuch der Naturwissenschajten, second edition, 1931, pp. 800-801; "Die Basler Mathematiker Daniel Bernoulli und Leonhard Euler. Hundert Jahre nach ihrem Tode gefeiert von der Naturforschenden Gesellschaft," Basle, 1884 (Annex to part VII of the proceedings of this Society); and Correspondance math&matique . . ., edited by Paul Heinrich Fuss, 1843 containing letters written by Daniel Bernoulli to Leonhard Euler, Nicolaus Fuss, and C. Goldbach.) should expect to have his desires more closely fuljilled, the risks anticipated by each must be deemed equal in value. No characteristic of the persons themselves ought to be taken into consideration; only those matters should be weighed carefully that pertain to the terms of the risk. The relevant finding might then be made by the highest judges established by public authority. But really there is here no need for judgment but of deliberation, i.e., rules would be set up whereby anyone could estimate his prospects from any risky undertaking in light of one's specific financial circumstances. $3. To make this clear it is perhaps advisable to consider the following example: Somehow a very poor fellow obtains a lottery ticket that will yield with equal probability either nothing or twenty thousand ducats. Will this man evaluate his chance of winning at ten thousand ducats? Would he not be illadvised to sell this lottery ticket for nine thousand ducats? To me it seems that the answer is in the negative. On the other hand I am inclined to believe that a rich man would be ill-advised to refuse to buy the lottery ticket for nine thousand ducats. If I am not wrong then it seems clear that all men cannot use the same rule to evaluate the gamble. The rule established in $1 must, therefore, be discarded. But anyone who considers the problem with perspicacity and interest will ascertain that the concept of value which we have used in this rule may be defined in a way which renders the entire procedure universally acceptable without reservation. To do this the determination of the value of an item must not be based on its price, but rather on the utility it yields. The price of the item is dependent only on the thing itself and is equal for everyone; the utility, however, is dependent on the particular circumstances of the person making the estimate. Thus there is no doubt that a gain of one thousand ducats is more significant to a pauper than to a rich man though both gain the same amount.
$4. The discussion has now been developed to a point where anyone may proceed with the investigation by the mere paraphrasing of one and the same principle. However, since the hypothesis is entirely new, it may nevertheless require some elucidation. I have, therefore, decided to explain by example what I have explored. Meanwhile, let us use this as a fundamental rule: I f the utility of each possible profit expectation i s multiplied by the number of ways in which it can occur, and we then divide the sum of these products by the total number of possible cases, a mean utility3 [moral expectation] will be obtained, and the profit which corresponds to this utility will equal the value of the risk in question.
$5. Thus it becomes evident that no valid measurement of the value of a risk can be obtained without consideration being given to its utility, that is to say, the utility of whatever gain accrues to the individual or, conversely, how much profit is required to yield a given utility. However it hardly seems plausible to make any precise generalizations since the utility of an item may change with circumstances. Thus, though a poor man generally obtains more utility than does a rich man from an equal gain, it is nevertheless conceivable, for example, that a rich prisoner who possesses two thousand ducats but needs two thousand ducats more to repurchase his freedom, will place a higher value on a gain of two thousand ducats than does another man who has less money than he. Though innumerable examples of this kind may be constructed, they represent exceedingly rare exceptions. We shall, therefore, do better to consider what usually happens, and in order to perceive the problem more correctly we shall assume that there is an imperceptibly small growth in the individual's wealth which proceeds continuously by infinitesimal increments. Now it is highly probable that any increase in wealth, no matter how insignificant, will always result in an increase in utility which i s inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods already possessed. To explain this hypothesis it is necessary to define what is meant by the quantity of goods. By this expression I mean to connote food, clothing, all things which add to the conveniences of life, and even to luxury-anything that can contribute to the adequate satisfaction of any sort of want. There is then nobody who can be said to possess nothing a t all in this sense unless he starves to death. For the great majority the most valuable portion of their possessions so defined will consist in their productive capacity, this term being taken to include even the beggar's talent : a man who is able to acquire ten ducats yearly by begging will scarcely be willing to accept a sum of fifty ducats on condition that he henceforth refrain from begging or otherwise trying to earn money. For he would have to live on this amount, and after he had spent it his existence must also come to an end. I doubt whether even those who do not possess a farthing and are burdened with financial obligations would be willing to free themselves of their debts or even to accept a still greater gift on such a condition. But if the beggar were to refuse such a contract unless immediately paid no less than one hundred ducats and the man pressed by creditors similarly demanded one thousand ducats, we might say that the former is possessed of wealth worth one hundred, and the latter of one thousand ducats, though in common parlance the former owns nothing and the latter less than nothing. $6. Having stated this definition, I return to the statement made in the previous paragraph which maintained that, in the absence of the unusual, the utility resulting from any small increase in wealth will be inversely proportionate to the quantity of goods previously possessed. Considering the nature of man, it seems to me that the foregoing hypothesis is apt to be valid for many people to whom this sort of comparison can be applied. Only a few do not spend their entire yearly incomes. But, if among these, one has a fortune worth a hundred thousand ducats and another a fortune worth the same number of semi-ducats and if the former receives from it a yearly income of five thousand ducats while the latter obtains the same number of semi-ducats it is quite clear that to the former a ducat has exactly the same significance as a semi-ducat to the latter, and that, therefore, the gain of one ducat will have to the former no higher value than the gain of a semi-ducat to the latter. Accordingly, if each makes a gain of one ducat the latter receives twice as much utility from it, having been enriched by two semiducats. This argument applies to many other cases which, therefore, need not be discussed separately. The proposition is all the more valid for the majority of men who possess no fortune apart from their working capacity which is their only source of livelihood. True, there are men to whom one ducat means more than many ducats do to others who are less rich but more generous than they. But since we shall now concern ourselves only with one individual (in different states of affluence) distinctions of this sort do not concern us. The man who is emotionally less affected by a gain will support a loss with greater patience.
Since, however, in special cases things can conceivably occur otherwise, I shall first deal with the most general case and then develop our special hypothesis in order thereby to satisfy everyone. $7. Therefore, let AB represent the quantity of goods initially possessed.
Then after extending AB, a curve BGLS must be constructed, whose ordinates CG, DH, EL, FM, etc., designate utilities corresponding to the abscissas BC, BD, BE, BF, etc., designating gains in wealth. Further, let m,n, p, q, etc., be the numbers which indicate the number of ways in which gains in wealth BC, BD, BE, B F [misprinted in the original as CF], etc., can occur. Then (in accord with $4) the moral expectation of the risky proposition referred to is given by:
Now, if we erect A& perpendicular to AR, and on it measure off AN = PO, the straight line NO -AB represents the gain which may properly be expected, or the value of the risky proposition in question. If we wish, further, to know how large a stake the individual should be willing to venture on this risky proposition, our curve must be extended in the opposite direction in such a way that the abscissa Bp now represents a loss and the ordinate po represents the corresponding decline in utility. Since in a fair game the disutility to be suffered by losing must be equal to the utility to be derived by winning, we must assume that An = AN, or po = PO. Thus Bp will indicate the stake more than which persons who consider their own pecuniary status should not venture.
COROLLARY 1 $8. Until now scientists have usually rested their hypothesis on the assumption that all gains must be evaluated exclusively in terms of themselves, i.e., on the basis of their intrinsic qualities, and that these gains will always produce a utility directly proportionate to the gain. On this hypothesis the curve BS becomes a straight line. Now if we again have:
and if, on both sides, the respective factors are introduced it follows that: which is in conformity with the usually accepted rule.
COROLLARY 11 $9. If AB were infinitely great, even in proportion to BF, the greatest possible gain, the arc BM may be considered very like an infinitesimally small straight line. Again in this case the usual rule [for the evaluation of risky propositions] is applicable, and may continue to be considered approximately valid in games of insignificant moment.
$10. Having dealt with the problem in the most general way we turn now to the aforementioned particular hypothesis, which, indeed, deserves prior attention to all others. First of all the nature of curve sBS must be investigated under the conditions postulated in $7. Since on our hypothesis we must consider infinitesimally small gains, we shall take gains BC and BD to be nearly equal, so that their difference CD becomes infinitesimally small. If we draw Gr parallel to BR, then rH will represent the infinitesimally small gain in utility to a man whose fortune is AC and who obtains the small gain, CD. This utility, however, should be related not only to the tiny gain CD, to which it is, other things being equal, proportionate, but also to AC, the fortune previously owned to which it is inversely proportionate. We therefore set: AC = x, CD = dx, CG = y, rH = bdx dy and AB = a ;and if b designates some constant we obtain dy = -or y = x X b log -. The curve sBS is therefore a logarithmic curve, the subtangent4of which a is everywhere b and whose asymptote is Qq. b log -= mb log -+ nb log -+ pb log -+ qb log -+ . .
AB AB AB
).
AB and therefore and if we subtract AB from this, the remaining magnitude, BP, will represent the value of the risky proposition in question.
Thus the preceding paragraph suggests the following rule:
A n y gain must be added to the fortune previously possessed, then this sum must be raised to the power given by the number of possible ways in which the gain may be obtained; these terns should then be multiplied together. Then of this product a root must be extracted the degree of which i s given by the number of all possible cases, and Jinally the value of the initial possessions must be subtracted therefrom; what then remains indicates the value of the risky proposition in question. This principle is essential for the measurement of the value of risky propositions in various cases. I would elaborate it into a complete theory as has been done with the traditional analysis, were it not that, despite its usefulness and originality, previous obligations do not permit me to undertake this task. I shall therefore, a t this time, mention only the more significantpoints among those which have a t first glance occurred to me. First, it appears that in many games, even those that are absolutely fair, both of the players may expect to suffer a loss; indeed this is Nature's admonition to avoid the dice altogether. . . . This follows from the concavity of curve sBS to BR. For in making the stake, Bp, equal to the expected gain, BP, it is clear that the disutility po which results from a loss will always exceed the expected gain in utility, PO. Although this result will be quite clear to the mathematician, I shall nevertheless explain it by example, so that it will be clear to everyone. Let us assume that of two players, both possessing one hundred ducats, each puts up half this sum as a stake in a game that offers the same probabilities to both players. Under this assumption each will then have fifty ducats plus the expectation of winning yet one hundred ducats more. However, the sum of the values of these two items amounts, by the rule of $12, to only (50'. 150')~ or 4 5 0 . 1 5 0 , i.e., less than eighty-seven ducats, so that, though the game be played under perfectly equal conditions for both, either will suffer an expected loss of more than thirteen ducats. We must strongly emphasize this truth, although it be self evident: the imprudence of a gambler will be the greater the larger the part of his fortune which he exposes to a game of chance. For this purpose we shall modify the previous example by assuming that one of the gamblers, before putting up his fifty ducat stake possessed two hundred ducats. This gambler suffers an expected loss of 200 -4150.250, which is not much greater than six ducats. $14. Since, therefore, everyone who bets any part of his fortune, however small, on a mathematically fair game of chance acts irrationally, it may be of interest to inquire how great an advantage the gambler must enjoy over his opponent in order to avoid any expected loss. Let us again consider a game which is as simple as possible, defined by two equiprobable outcomes one of which is favorable and the other unfavorable. Let us take a to be the gain to be won in case of a favorable outcome, and x to be the stake which is lost in the unfavorable case. If the initial quantity of goods possessed is a we have AB = a ; B P = a ; PO = b log-a + a (see $lo), and since (by $7) po = PO it follows by the nature a of a logarithmic curve that Bp = a -aa + a' Since however Bp represents the stake x, we have x = -a a a magnitude which is always smaller than a, the expected a + a gain. It also follows from this that a man who risks his entire fortune acts like a simpleton, however great may be the possible gain. No one will have difficulty in being persuaded of this if he has carefully examined our definitions given above. Moreover, this result sheds light on a statement which is universally accepted in practice: it may be reasonable for some individuals to invest in a doubtful enterprise and yet be unreasonable for others to do so. $15. The procedure customarily employed by merchants in the insurance of commodities transported by sea seems to merit special attention. This may again be explained by an example. Suppose Caius: a Petersburg merchant, has pur-chased commodities in Amsterdam which he could sell for ten thousand rubles if he had them in Petersburg. He therefore orders them to be shipped there by sea, but is in doubt whether or not to insure them. He is well aware of the fact that a t this time of year of one hundred ships which sail from Amsterdam to Petersburg, five are usually lost. However, there is no insurance available below the price of eight hundred rubles a cargo, an amount which he considers out-,rageously high. The question is, therefore, how much wealth must Caius possess apart from the goods under consideration in order that it be sensible for him to abstain from insuring them? If x represents his fortune, then this together with the value of the expectation of the safe arrival of his goods is given by = 5043.If, therefore, Caius, apart from the expectation of receiving his commodities, possesses an amount greater than 5043 rubles he will be right in not buying insurance. If, on the contrary, his wealth is less than this amount he should insure his cargo. And if the question be asked "What minimum fortune should be possessed by the man who offers to provide this insurance in order for him to be rational in doing so?" We must answer thus: let y be his fortune, then or approximately, y = 14243,a figure which is obtained from the foregoing without additional calculation. A man less wealthy than this would be foolish to provide the surety, but it makes sense for a wealthier man to do so. From this it is clear that the introduction of this sort of insurance has been so useful since it offers advantages to all persons concerned. Similarly, had Caius been able to obtain the insurance for six hundred rubles he would have been unwise to refuse it if he possessed less than 20478 rubles, but he would have acted much too cautiously had he insured his commodities at this rate when his fortune was greater than this amount. On the other hand a man would act unadvisedly if he were to offer to sponsor this insurance for six hundred rubles when he himself possesses less than 29878 rubles. However, he would be well advised to do so if he possessed more than that amount. But no one, however rich, would be managing his affairs properly if he individually undertook the insurance for less than five hundred rubles. $16.Another rule which may prove useful can be derived from our theory. This is the rule that it is advisable to divide goods which are exposed to some danger into several portions rather than to risk them all together. Again I shall explain this more precisely by an example. Sempronius owns goods at home worth a total of 4000 ducats and in addition possesses 8000 ducats worth of commodities in foreign countries from where they can only be transported by sea. However, our daily experience teaches us that of ten ships one perishes. Under these conditions I maintain that if Sempronius trusted all his 8000 ducats of goods to one ship his expectation of the commodities is worth 6751 ducats. That is V12000~.4000-4000.
If, however, he were to trust equal portions of these commodities to two ships the value of his expectation would be 100 d120008~. 80001s .4000 -4000, i.e., 7033 ducats.
I n this way the value of Sempronius' prospects of success will grow more favorable the smaller the proportion committed to each ship. However, his expectation will never rise in value above 7200 ducats. This counsel will be equally serviceable for those who invest their fortunes in foreign bills of exchange and other hazardous enterprises. $17. I am forced to omit many novel remarks though these would clearly not be unserviceable. And, though a person who is fairly judicious by natural instinct might have realized and spontaneously applied much of what I have here explained, hardly anyone believed it possible to define these problems with the precision we have employed in our examples. Since all our propositions harmonize perfectly with experience it would be wrong to neglect them as abstractions resting upon precarious hypotheses. This is further confirmed by the following example which inspired these thoughts, and whose history is as follows: My most honorable cousin the celebrated Nicolas Bernoulli, Professor utriusque iuris6 a t the University of Basle, once submitted five problems to the highly distinguished7 mathematician Montmort.' These problems are reproduced in the work L'analyse sur les jeux de hazard de M. de Montmort, p. 402. The last of these problems runs as follows: Peter tosses a coin and continues to do so until it should land "heads" when it comes to the ground. He agrees to give Paul one ducat if he gets "heads" on the very $first throw, two ducats if he gets it on the second, four if on the third, eight if on the fourth, and so on, so that with each additional throw the number of ducats he must pay is doubled. Suppose we seek to determine the value of Paul's expectation. My aforementioned cousin discussed this problem in a letter to me asking for my opinion. Although the standard calculation showsg that the value of Paul's expectation is infinitely great, it has, he said, to be admitted that any fairly reasonable man would sell his chance, with great pleasure, for twenty ducats. The accepted method of calculation does, indeed, value Paul's prospects at infinity though no one would be willing to purchase it at a moderately high price.
6 Faculties of law of continental European universities bestow up to the present time the title of a Doctor utriusque juris, which means Doctor of both systems of laws, the Roman and the canon law. [Translator] Cl., i.e., Vir Clarissimus, a title of respect.
[Translator] 8 Montmort, Pierre RBmond, de (1678 RBmond, de ( -1719 . The work referred to here is the then famous "Essai d'analyse sur les jeux de hazard," Paris, 1708. Appended to the second edition, published in 1713, is Montmort's correspondence with Jean and Nicolas Bernoulli referring to the problems of chance and probabilities. [Translator] .
9 The probability of heads turning up on the 1st throw is 1/2. Since in this case Paul receives one ducat, this probability contributes 112.1 = 112 ducats to his expectation. The probability of heads turning up on the 2nd throw is 114. Since in this case Paul receives 2 ducats, this possibility contributes 114.2 = 1/2 to his expectation. Similarly, for every integer n, the possibility of heads turning up on the n-th throw contributes 1/2".2"-' = 1/2 ducats to his expectation. Paul's total expectation is therefore 1/2 +1/2 f +112 + . . -, and that is infinite -Karl Menger.
If, however, we apply our new rule to this problem we may see the solution and thus unravel the knot. The solution of the problem by our principles is as follows.
$18. The number of cases to be considered here is infinite: in one half of the cases the game will end a t the first throw, in one quarter of the cases it will conclude a t the second, in an eighth part of the cases with the third, in a sixteenth part with the fourth, and so on.'' If we designate the number of cases through infinity by N it is clear that there are g N cases in which Paul gains one ducat, X N cases in which he gains two ducats, %N in which he gains four, l/isN in which he gains eight, and so on, ad infinitum. Let us represent Paul's fortune by a ;the proposition in question will then be worth $19. From this formula which evaluates Paul's prospective gain i t follows that this value will increase with the size of Paul's fortune and will never attain an infinite value unIess Paul's wealth simuItaneously becomes infinite. I n addition we obtain the following corollaries. If Paul owned nothing a t all the value of his expectation would be which amounts to two ducats, precisely. If he owned ten ducats his opportunity would be worth approximately three ducats; it would be worth approximately four if his wealth were one hundred, and six if he possessed one thousand. From this we can easily see what a tremendous fortune a man must own for it to make sense for him to purchase Paul's opportunity for twenty ducats. The amount which the buyer ought to pay for this proposition differs somewhat from the amount it would be worth to him were it already in his possession. Since, however, this difference is exceedingly small if Q: (Paul's fortune) is great, l o Since the number of cases is infinite, i t is impossible to speak about one half of the cases, one quarter of the cases, etc., and the letter N in Bernoulli's argument is meaningless. However, Paul's expectation on the basis of Bernoulli's hypothesis concerning evaluation can be found by the same method by which, in footnote 9, Paul's classical expectation was determined. If Paul's fortune is a ducats, then, according to Bernoulli, he attributes a + 2''-1 to a gain of 2"-l ducats the value b log -.If the probability of this gain is 1/2n, his + 2"-l) "Perhaps I am mistaken, but I believe that I have solved the extraordinary" problem which you submitted to M. de Montmort, in your letter of September 9," 1713, (problem 5, page 402). For the sake of simplicity I shall assume that A" tosses a coin into the air and B commits himself to give A 1 ducat if, at the" first throw, the coin falls with its cross upward; 2 if it falls thus only a t the" second throw, 4 if at the third throw, 8 if at the fourth throw, etc. The paradox" consists in the infinite sum which calculation yields as the equivalent which"
A must pay to B. This seems absurd since no reasonable man would be willing" to pay 20 ducats as equivalent. You ask for an explanation of the discrepancy" between the mathematical calculation and the vulgar evaluation. I believe" that it results from the fact that, in their theory, mathematicians evaluate" money in proportion to its quantity while, in practice, people with common" sense evaluate money in proportion to the utility they can obtain from it. The" mathematical expectation is rendered infinite by the enormous amount which" I can win if the coin does not fall with its cross upward until rather late, perhaps'' a t the hundredth or thousandth throw. Now, as a matter of fact, if I reason" as a sensible man, this sum is worth no more to me, causes me no more pleasure" Bernoulli's paper had been submitted to the Imperial Academy of Sciences in Petersburg. [Translator] '2 Cramer, Gabriel, famous mathematician, born in Geneva, Switzerland (1704-1752). [Translator] '3 The following passage of the original text is in French. [Translator] "and influences me no more to accept the game than does a sum amounting "only to ten or twenty million ducats. Let us suppose, therefore, that any "amount above 10 millions, or (for the sake of simplicity) above 224= 166777216 "ducats be deemed by him equal in value to zz4ducats or, better yet, that I "can never win more than that amount, no matter how long it takes before the "coin falls with its cross upward. "The equivalent can turn out to be smaller yet if we adopt some alternative "hypothesis on the moral value of wealth. For that which I have just assumed "is not entirely valid since, while it is true that 100 millions yield more satis-"faction than do 10 millions, they do not give ten times as much. If, for example, "we suppose the moral value of goods to be directly proportionate to the square "root of their mathematical quantities, e.g., that the satisfaction provided by "40000000 is double that provided by 10000000, my psychic expectation "becomes "However this magnitude is not the equivalent we seek, for this equivalent '(need not be equal to my moral expectation but should rather be of such a "magnitude that the pain caused by its loss is equal to the moral expectation "of the pleasure I hope to derive from my gain. Therefore, the equivalent must, on our hypothesis, amount to (2 -1 d5) % = (6 -a = 2.9 -..,which"
is consequently less than 3, truly a trifling amount, but nevertheless, I believe," closer than is 13 to the vulgar evaluation."
